This narrative concerns conditions within the Texas criminal justice system
Young, David L.
This narrative concerns conditions within the Texas Criminal Justice System, and at all times this narrative is first-hand knowledge from 2/10/2010 until this writing 12/1/2019 and still continues.
The drug trade within this institution is predominately driven by various gangs, copious numbers of employees, and inmates having visitors make drops of contraband.
A single ten dollar phone will bring three hundred dollars, while a single pound of K-2 will sold for one thousand dollars. The allure of quick cash to augment a serious deficiency in state salaries is apparently strong, and being prosecuted is a rare occurrence.
2010 I arrived at the chaotic Bradshaw State Jail, and holding facility for the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Gangs, violence, drugs, and prostitution, women often ply their trade in pairs or groups making quick cash from their captive audience, while other male and female employees deliver K2, cell phones, and other types of contraband.
Early 2012 I was classified outside trusty -- the lowest classification -- shipped to a camp outside the Main Compound at the Jester III unit,
Page 2 of 15 and by the end of 2012 I am watching numerous gang members, and at least five employees engaged in a lively business of K-2, and cell phones, K-2 being the new drug of choise in this institution, and throughout America.
K-2 is classified as a synthetic marijuana, it interacts with brain cell receptors as a delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), the effects on brain operation is significant, and make the drug more unpredictable and dangerous.
Some of the effects are: suicidal ideation and attempts at suicide, stroke, death, cognitive impairments, brain damage, paranoia, and psychosis to name a few.
K-2/Spice products are laced with various toxic substances, such as brodifacoum a chemical found in rat poison which cause blood in their urine, coughing up blood, and internal bleeding. Benzene, xylene, and chiefly mixtures of toxic petroleum distillates causing a dangerous high or psychotic event.
In various means of communication with Jester III officials concerning the K-2 smoking, and being exposed to secondhand smoke, individuals were having family members using anonymous text to alert officials that we had a problem at our trusty camp with K-2, and employees were involved without success.
Page 3 of 15
In October 2015, a complaint was faxed to law enforcement by a law professor from the University of Texas Austin, and one complaint filed to Office of Inspector General Austin Texas.
In late October 2015 the Assistant Warden asked for an interview with me concerning the employees involved. During the interview I described in detail how their operation worked, and to add emphasis to my point of having two dirty officers at the trusty camp, I repeated a security phone call between the Assistant Warden, and the trusty camp lieutenant, verbatim.
Being the unit Artist I am constantly in the trusty camp office under the lieutenant's feet watching how this operation worked.
Will suffice to say this warden was in shock, so much so that she never tried to ask how I could repeat a security call, a first red flag.
The following day, a policing agency (unit based) came for an interview, called Office of Inspector General alleged to be in charge of criminal activity.
I explained to two investigators how the operation
Page 4 of 15 worked and how two employees were involved.
We have what is called a community squad that provides services for state agencies and their properties. Within this community squad was a single inmate in the K-2 operation with a lieutenant and one community squad officer.
This community squad was involved in the upkeep of a parole office in Houston, over a period of almost two years the officer allowed a single inmate to use a cell phone in the parole office to call in drops of various drugs, chiefly K-2.
The contraband would be brought back to Jester III for sales with the aid of the trusty camp lieutenant, and community squad officer.
The Office of Inspector General Investigators requested I be given a phone number directly to an agent to keep an eye out for the next K-2 to be picked up. I was assured the officers using this inmate would be arrested for their actions, I had no reason not to believe these individuals, but it turned out to be a serious oversight.
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By December 2015 it was obvious something was wrong, the investigators began to stay away from conversations about employees, and in a heated exchange I accused the investigator of trying to cover for these officers.
The investigator explained the criminal investigation of the officers would be done by the warden, not how that works at all, a screaming red flag, and I was sure this investigation was a sham.
I had no quick way to alert the individuals watching out for my safety, and the community squad was already headed for the Houston parole office.
I called the contact number to the investigator. She already had a surveillance team in position around the parole parking lot. I warned this agent I was going to whistleblow for what they were doing and hung up.
The surveillance team captured on video the lone inmate using the cell phone in the parking lot, to call for a drop. This drop was made captured on video, and the individual making the drop was allowed to escape, OIG did not want Houston HPD or any news media alerted to drug dealing from a TDCI van, no question the fix was in.
Page 6 of 15
The van returned to the trusty camp and surrounded by unit officials only, and taken into custody. The five inmates were taken to unit lockup, the community squad officer was either summarily dismissed or allowed to retire, an all to common practice within Texas Department of Criminal Justice, their surreptitious creed: "We look out for out own," allowing rogue officers to escape detection, and prosecution the majority of the time.
The trusty camp lieutenant was allowed to continue working as if nothing happened.
The corruption and trying to keep me quiet was obvious, no question TDCI dealing dope in Housing parking lot is a big deal. When TDCI officials came to investigate, I was not allowed near any officials.
I began to use outside contacts with the largest activist group in Texas, and a law professor friend from University of Texas, feeding them information, for which they requested to make a computer file for records, and my personal safety.
During 2016 four other inmates were gathering information on employees engaged in criminal activity
Page 7 of 15
I turned the information over to this activist group.
During this period the rogue lieutenant began stealing grievances -- our complaint resolution -- trying to find out where the information was coming from.
I was called to the dayroom by inmates in time to observe the lieutenant putting our complaints in his pocket.
I wrote a complaint to be faxed to Huntsville Texas over the thefts, further my contact's e-mail a complaint to Jail Standards concerning these thefts, and other criminal activity by employees.
There are atleas four other employees engaged in K-2 and cell phone sales. A single ten dollar cell phone sells for no less than three hundred, phones are essential in gang drug business, and you will not find a unit that these dangerous toys are not saled.
K-2 sells at a unit for approximately one thousand per pound case, an employee can purchase a pound for approximately two hundred and fifty, employees have little fear of being caught and prosecuted.
Page 8 of 15
I was confronted in 2016 by administration concerning a fax from law enforcement asking about rogue employees. Administration tried to divert me back to unit OIG. Investigators and I refused.
The trusty camp lieutenant was forced to retire without prosecution or any record of his activity. One month later this x-lieutenant claimed he was missing a pistol from the state housing he occupied, he further alleged a inmate stole it.
Obviously this was to get even with administration for the forced retirement. The claim triggered a unit lockdown, and triggers an FBI investigation, at no time was I allowed near these agents.
After lie detector test on inmates -- which the lieutenant refused -- the FBI turned it's attention on the lieutenant, the lieutenant promptly found the pistol in his vehicle, the lieutenant was held responsible for the sixteen thousand for investigation fees from the Richmond Police Department, and the FBI, the lieutenant was under investigation and I was quietly shipped to the C.T. Terrell unit under the guise of needing a unit artist at the trusty camp.
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Arriving at the C.T. Terrell early 2017, I was immediately interviewed by Office of Inspector General agent concerning Jester III, and an inquiry by a Texas activist group to their liaison in the Central Office TDCI.
The agent listened to what Jester III administration had done, and what unit agents had covered up. He agreed that the were out-of-bounds. However, he could do nothing about Jester III, a disingenuous answer.
The agent asked would I be interested in looking into employees using inmates to do drug business -- incredible! -- I declined the juvenile attempt, these people do not want these employees prosecuted which shall become further obvious.
C.T. Terrell 2018 we are overrun with K-2, numerous cell phones, morphine, and dip used in trade for K-2. They are using on the dorms, showers, and recreational area, it has become a circus, and a health hazard, this is a medical unit, although you couldn't tell.
Complaints were being made through anonymous means without much result. Mid 2018 I filed a grievance -- security type -- concerning state vehicles and employees engaged in illegal
Page 10 of 15 drug trade. I was called to the main building, interviewed by three ranking officials as to why I wrote the grievance. Not one of these officials wanted to address the issue, and I was returned to the trusty camp.
Mid 2018, another O.I.G. investigator from Stringfellow unit -- a mile away -- requested an interview concerning the grievance, and again what happened at Jester III.
I realized they were attempting to keep me in the same loop, grievance, Huntsville, and unit Office of Inspector General so the information could be contained. The investigator ask would I accept another direct phone number to his personal phone, and would I be willing to I.D. employees doing business, later asking would I wear a recording device and body cam.
I had already made up my mind to expose the corruption. I agreed to accept a number and the contest began. I know this a sham I just need proof, if it seems a dicy indeavor no question, but I have responsible parties monitoring the process.
Between mid 2018 and 3-9-19 this agent was given four operations concerning employees using inmates to do
Page 11 of 15 drug business. I infiltrated at least two groups of alleged gang members to work my way to these employees. I had identified at least four employees using their personal cell phones, money cards, and cash to do business. Further, using tax payer money to purchase personal items of which I have first-hand knowledge.
From 2018 until 2019 this information was transferred by phone, personal interviews that were tape recorded, and written narratives to this agent.
The agent began to make excuses as to why he could not apprehend these individuals for prosecution, the agent continued requesting just enough information to get them fired, and at that point it was abundantly clear the entire production was a sham.
During this period the agent was advised of a drop of one cell phone, Zanex, oxycodone, and forty cans of dip. I advised the agent it was necessary to infiltrate a ring of about six gang related individuals and one employee to get this information. I acquired the description of the drop vehicle make and model and a date of delivery to this unit.
Further, I advised the agent I agreed to find a safe
Page 12 of 15 place to hide the phone for these individuals, no other way to get the drop date and details, it didn't matter the drop would be captured according to the agent.
I had already advised the agent that he was circumventing the issue of employees, and that I would go around him with the information, he ask me not to do that, otherwise he could not get these employees. It was clear he had no intention to stop these individuals, you must understand the philosophy here, being labeled less than human, it would be unconscionable to have some miscreant whistleblow, on such minor peccadillos as employees involved in drug dealing..."That is the skewed philosophy in these institutions."
I advised outside contacts I was about to pull the plug on this investigator, and whistleblow to an outside Agency.
Upon information and belief after advising an outside Agency concerning the agent's conduct, this agency alerted the OIG agent I was whistleblowing concerning his actions.
On 3-5-19, I called the unit OIG agent to confirm the date of the drop 3-9-19 at this unit, the agent requested
Page 13 of 15 we have a face-to-face meeting to convey details around 3-7 or 3-8-19. These dates passed without contact from the agent, the agent was setting me up, he know what I had to do to get this information, he was retaliating for whistleblowing on him concerning dirty employees.
3-9-19 arrived and the drop was made. I called the agents phone left a message Saturday morning leaving a digital trail to the investigators phone.
My decision was to continue with these individuals until I could get help, or refuse to help at the last minute and take my chances, I continued on with this operation alone, and began to look for assistance.
The phone in question came to this dorm I live in, for four months it was in operation while my contacts and I looked for relief.
On 6-24-19 an outline was given to the Executive Director Huntsville concerning this phone and the criminal activity, on 7-1-19 a unit security team -- not OIG -- raided this dorm at 1:30am, capturing the phone ending one threat.
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On 7-7-2019 a sworn declaration was given to the Executive Director Huntsville, this declaration gave specific details concerning employees involved in criminal activity, their names and how their operation works, specific items taken by these state employees.
I was interviewed by Administration C.T. Terrell where they fain concern for my safty, and had few concerns or desires to address these employees that are still in business.
The continuing use of K-2, the propensity for officials to blame the drug problem on inmates, and ignore the root of the problem, and keep the public ignorant of the present danger.
Political correctness is far more important than public safety, employee safety, or the safety and health of the inmate population.
As to retaliation always a concern, especially under these circumstances. I will bring to your attention an incident in late 2018, whereby a Major at the Ramsey I unit tried to set up an inmate by placing a weapon
Page 15 of 15 in the inmates living quarters, then pretending to bust the individual.
When it was discovered by the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, they were simply going to reduce the Major's rank, and allow him to continue to work at this institution.
Fortunately, a Houston Chronicle reporter sent the incident viral, the Major had already been allowed to leave this property and go to Huntsville, at no time did the Rosharon Police Dept. nor Office of Inspector General agents, attempt to take this Major into custody.
Only after the interruption of the Texas Rangers and the F.B.I. Texas Department of Criminal Justice announced on T.V. and radio they would fully cooperate with any investigation.
The criminal indictment of this Major and two codefendants of a third degree felony was finally handed down.
No question about retaliation and Texas Department of Criminal Justice involvement, this is hardly atypical behavior.
My current drama is ongoing but look forward to justice being served.
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